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introduction 
The well-intentioned efforts to help victims must be judged 
by their results, not our intentions. Thus what we need to 
do is to treat domestic violence as a subject for relentless 
research, testing a wide range of solutions, rather than 
simply assuming that punishment ‘works’.1 
 -Lawrence Sherman. 
When Sara Schmidt reported her husband’s domestic abuse, 
she never could have imagined that just a week later she would 
be dead in her in-laws’ Wisconsin driveway.2 After her murder, it 
came to light that Sara had endured abusive behavior from her 
husband of fifteen years for some time.3 After several years of 
verbal and emotional abuse, his abuse allegedly turned physical 
on December 31, 2017.4 That night, instead of attending a party 
to ring in the new year, Robert Schmidt held a gun to his wife’s 
head and raped her.5 On January 2, 2018, Sara filed a police 
report stating that she no longer felt that she or her children were 
safe living with Robert, but did not specifically request that he 
be arrested.6 Wisconsin is a mandatory arrest state, however, so 
investigators arrested Robert the same day.7 On January 5, 
Robert was released on bond.8 Around dinnertime four days later, 
Sarah pulled her van into her in-laws’ driveway to drop off the 
 
1. Belinda Luscombe, When Not to Arrest an Abuser in a Domestic 
Violence Case, TIME (Mar. 5, 2014), http://time.com/12682/when-
not-to-arrest-an-abuser-in-a-domestic-violence-case/ [https://
perma.cc/P5MM-8C4V]. 
2. Allison Dirr, In 10 Days, A Husband’s Violence Escalated From A 
Brutal Assault to Murder in Public View, POST CRESCENT (Aug. 
13, 2018, 6:17 AM), https://www.postcrescent.com/story/news/
crime/2018/08/13/appleton-murder-suicide-robert-schmidt-
escalated-10-days-assault/810055002/ [https://perma.cc/4Z3Z-
ER2T]. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
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couple’s three children, but she was greeted by an irate Robert.9 
Robert pulled out a gun, forced Sarah into the passenger seat of 
the van and shot her to death before turning the gun on himself.10 
Their three young children were inside the house.11 
For officers dealing with domestic violence, situations like 
these are common. In this area of Fox Valley, Wisconsin, the 
sheriff’s office handled three situations similar to this one within 
a matter of months.12 Wisconsin, like many states, has legislation 
that requires officers to arrest an alleged abuser when responding 
to calls or reports of domestic violence.13 While these laws were 
once hailed as a solution to domestic violence across the country, 
recent studies have called the effectiveness of these laws into 
question.14 Instead of protecting victims, these laws may be 
causing more harm to victims in the long run. 
This Note argues that mandatory-arrest laws are not effective 
in protecting domestic violence victims. Part I will examine why 
 
9. Id. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 968.075(2) (2016); see also ALASKA STAT. 
§ 18.65.530(a) (2018); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §13– 3601(B) (2018); 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-803.6 (2019); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-
38b(a) (2018); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1031(a) (2019); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 22-2307 (b)(1) (2019); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 236.12(2)(b) 
(2018); LA. STAT. ANN. § 46-2140 A(1) (2015); ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 19-A § 4012 (5) (2019); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-3-7 (3) 
(2017); NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.137 (2019); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2c:25-
21 (West 2019); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.10(1) (2019); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.032(A)(1)(a) (2019); OR. REV. STAT. 
§§ 133.055(2)(a), (b), (c), (d) (2019); 12 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 12-29-
3(b), (c) (2014); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-25-70; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 
§ 23A-3-2.1 (2015); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-2.2 (2) (2013); WASH. 
REV. CODE ANN. §§10.31.100 (2)(a), (d) (2019). 
14. See, e.g., Lawrence W. Sherman & Heather M. Harris, Increased 
Death Rates of Domestic Violence Victims from Arresting vs. 
Warning Suspects in the Milwaukee Domestic Violence Experiment 
(MilDVE), 11 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2015); Radha 
Iyengar, Does the Certainty of Arrest Reduce Domestic Violence? 
Evidence from Mandatory and Recommended Arrest Laws (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13186, 2007), 
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w13186.pdf [https://
perma.cc/P4Q9-SR7J]. 
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states began adopting these laws. First, it will discuss a study by 
Lawrence Sherman indicating that mandatory arrest was the 
most effective means of deterring future violence in relationships 
plagued by domestic violence. It will then discuss the Violence 
Against Women Act and how its drafters relied on Sherman’s 
study in deciding to allocate grant money to jurisdictions that 
enacted mandatory-arrest laws for domestic violence. 
Part II will discuss the components of present-day 
mandatory-arrest laws and how variations in state statutes can 
change the effect that they have on victims. The first section will 
discuss the different forms of arrest statutes and how the words 
“shall” and “may” can change what is required under the statute. 
The second section will discuss when the term “family member” 
is used in the statute and the limits it can place on the ability of 
police to arrest suspects. Finally, it will discuss dual arrests and 
how including a policy of arresting the “primary aggressor” in an 
arrest statute can help eliminate them. 
Part III will discuss the present effect that these statutes have 
on victims. It will first review Sherman’s more recent study and 
other subsequent reports that argue that his findings in his 
original study were faulty. These studies indicate that mandatory 
arrest statutes are likely not as effective at protecting victims as 
originally thought. It will then discuss both the physical and 
mental harm victims may suffer as a result of these laws. 
Part IV will develop recommendations as to changes that 
should be made to domestic violence arrest laws to best protect 
victims. It argues that jurisdictions should adopt laws that allow 
for guided police discretion by following the preferential-arrest 
model. It will also argue that police departments should provide 
more outreach programs to help victims. It will discuss two 
inventive methods developed in police departments: the 
“cocooning” method and the creation of domestic violence units 
in police departments that work hand in hand with victim 
advocacy groups to better respond to domestic violence calls. 
I. Background 
A. Sherman’s First Study 
During the early 1970’s and 80’s, most police departments felt 
that instances of domestic violence were problems for the family 
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to work through, not the police.15 Instead of viewing it as criminal 
conduct, officers felt that domestic violence was a normal method 
of “controlling” a spouse, and therefore was outside the scope of 
police intervention.16 Most instances of domestic violence were 
characterized as misdemeanors, with arrests being a last resort 
rather than a common option.17 Indeed, many jurisdictions barred 
arrests for any misdemeanor assault unless the act actually 
occurred in front of the officer.18 As a result, there was little legal 
intervention to help curb the torment plaguing victims of 
domestic violence.19 
Activism surrounding domestic violence began to increase in 
the mid-1970s.20 Several clinical psychologists argued that there 
should be increased police intervention when officers respond to 
calls of domestic violence.21 Several studies also publicized 
statistics on the actual rates of domestic violence in the country, 
prompting a battered women’s movement aimed at increasing 
domestic violence awareness.22 These groups called for a more 
serious approach to domestic violence policy and a change in 
 
15. See Jeffrey Fagan, Criminalization of Domestic Violence: Promises 
and Limits, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE 1, 3 (1995), available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/crimdom.pdf [https://perma.cc/
7PF8-68BM]. 
16. Deborah Epstein, Redefining the State’s Response to Domestic 
Violence: Past Victories and Future Challenges, 1 GEO. J. GENDER 
& L. 127, 128–129 (1999). 
17. Nick Keppler, In Allegheny County, Domestic Violence Offenders 
Often Avoid the Most Serious Punishment, PUBLIC SOURCE (Feb. 
18, 2019), https://www.publicsource.org/allegheny-county-
domestic-violence-offenders-avoid-most-serious-punishment/ 
[https://perma.cc/Y58P-CXWU]; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 250231, POLICE RESPONSE TO 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, 2006–2015 (2017). 
18. Kathleen J. Ferraro, Police Woman Battering, 36 SOC. PROBS. 61 
(1989). 
19. See id. at 61–62. 
20. JAMI AKE & GRETCHEN ARNOLD, A BRIEF HISTORY OF ANTI-
VIOLENCE-AGAINST-WOMEN MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 3 
(2017). 
21. Nat’l Inst. of Justice, Searching for Answers: Annual Evaluation 
Report on Drugs and Crime: 1992, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, at 31 
(1992). 
22. Fagan, supra note 15, at 12–13. 
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police intervention strategies.23 As a result, the National Academy 
of Sciences issued a report calling for an assessment of current 
police policies and supported deterrence-oriented practices.24 The 
National Institute of Justice took note and allocated funding for 
studies on the effects of deterrence-based policies.25 
From 1981 to 1982, Lawrence W. Sherman conducted one 
such study evaluating the effectiveness of police responses to calls 
regarding domestic violence in Minneapolis, Minnesota.26 This 
research sought to compare three different police approaches to 
domestic violence: arrest, an order for the suspect to leave the 
scene of the assault for eight hours, or some form of mediation at 
the officer’s discretion.27 Using a lottery system, officers employed 
one of these three methods when answering calls of misdemeanor 
domestic violence.28 Victims were then subject to detailed follow-
up interviews every two weeks for twenty-four weeks to see how 
the police response affected their lives.29 A total of 314 case 
reports were evaluated.30 Only 161 of the victims followed through 
with the 12 interviews.31 During these interviews, Sherman looked 
for any indications that the individual arrested had repeated their 
domestic violence within the six-month period and determined if 
they had a prior criminal record.32 He also looked at victims’ 
perspectives and how their lives had changed due to the specific 
form of police response used.33 
 
23. Clara Van Eck, Changing the Message: Battered Women’s 
Advocates & Their Fight Against Domestic Violence at the Local, 
State, and Federal Level, 1970s–1990s, OLD DOMINION U. 1, 28 
(2017). 
24. Fagan, supra note 15, at 13. 
25. ALFRED BLUMSTEIN & JOAN PETERSILIA, THE NAT’L INST. OF 
JUSTICE, 25 YEARS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESEARCH 15–16 (1994). 
26. LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN & RICHARD A. BERK, THE MINNEAPOLIS 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE EXPERIMENT 1-8 (1984). 
27. Id. at 4. 
28. Id. at 2. 
29. Id. at 3. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. at 5. 
32. Id. at 6. 
33. Id. at 7. 
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Through these interviews, Sherman concluded that 
individuals who were arrested had the lowest percentage of 
repeated violence (19%), compared to those given advice (37%) 
and those sent away (33%).34 Police records concerning repeat 
offenders revealed similar statistics.35 Further analysis indicated 
that these findings were the same across the board for all suspects 
regardless of race, employment, education, or criminal history.36 
Based on these findings, Sherman concluded that arrest was the 
most effective form of police action for purposes of deterring 
future domestic violence.37 
Furthermore, Sherman found that arrest was most effective 
when the police listened to the victim’s account of the domestic 
violence.38 Out of 194 victims, 9% reported repeated violence 
when the police took the victim’s statement, as opposed to the 
26% who experienced repeated violence after an arrest where the 
police simply arrested the suspect.39 Sherman argued that victims 
may be “empowered” by being able to give their account of the 
story.40 He theorized that if police ignored a victim’s statement, 
then the suspect may feel that the arrest was arbitrary and be 
less deterred from repeating violence in the future.41 Because of 
these findings, Sherman encouraged jurisdictions to implement 
mandatory or preferred-arrest laws to help decrease instances of 
repeated violence by domestic abusers.42 The study received a 
great deal of media attention, prompting a response from many 
police departments across the country.43 While only fifteen 
jurisdictions had mandatory-arrest statutes on the books before 
 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 6. 
36. Id. at 7. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 8. 
43. Luscombe, supra note 1. 
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this study was published, that number increased to twenty-three 
soon after publication.44 
B. The Violence Against Women Act 
Studies like Sherman’s, and pressure from grassroots 
campaigns by women’s groups, prompted Congress to take 
action.45 The Violence Against Women Act (the Act) was first 
passed in 1994 and provided both a celebrated and controversial 
response to domestic and sexual violence against women.46 The 
Act outlined funding initiatives and proposed policy measures 
that jurisdictions should implement in order to better address 
domestic violence,47 including “the use of mandatory arrests of 
accused offenders.”48 The Act did not specify which provisions 
should be included in these laws. The only guidance it offered was 
to discourage the arrest of both the victim and abuser, and it 
explicitly argued that mediation should be prohibited in instances 
of domestic violence.49 Furthermore, the Act indicated a 
preference for more aggressive prosecution policies.50 This led to 
policies that allowed the prosecution of domestic violence cases 
regardless of whether the victim cooperated.51 This Act 
incentivized the use of mandatory arrest because the jurisdictions 
that passed these types of laws would be eligible for federal grant 
 
44. David Hirschel, Domestic Violence Cases: What Research Shows 
About Arrest and Dual Arrest Rates, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE (July 
25, 2008), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/222679.pdf. 
[https://perma.cc/L4S9-X7Y8]. 
45. See Kate Pickert, What’s Wrong With the Violence Against 
Women Act?, TIME (Feb. 27, 2013), http://nation.time.com/
2013/02/27/whats-wrong-with-the-violence-against-women-act/. 
[https://perma.cc/9WPK-K76F]. 
46. Id. 
47. Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13925 (1994). 
48. Violence Against Women Act of 1991, H.R. 1502, 102nd Cong. 
(1991). 
49. See id. 
50. Id. 
51. Pickert, supra note 45. 
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money.52 However, there was nothing that identified how this 
money should be used.53 
The Act was subsequently renewed in 2000 and 2005 with 
similar provisions relating to mandatory arrest.54 It also included 
language emphasizing that the Act was not limited to the 
protection of women, but rather the protection of victims in 
general.55 This was a direct response to several critics of the act 
who argued that the provisions painted all women as victims and 
all men as abusers.56 Furthermore, the Act provided for more 
funding for research into the factors that lead to abusive behavior 
after several women’s groups claimed that the Act was simply a 
surface-level fix to a much bigger problem.57 Other problems arose 
in 2012 when the Act was again up for reauthorization.58 
Conservative Republicans opposed provisions extending services 
under the Act to undocumented immigrants and LGBT 
individuals.59 The bill was not reauthorized until 2013; it still 
contained provisions encouraging the implementation of 
mandatory arrest statutes.60 
 
52. Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13925 (1994). 
53. Id. 
54. See History of VAWA, LEGALMOMENTUM, https://www.legal
momentum.org/history-vawa [https://perma.cc/Q5SH-V9L4] (last 
visited Jan. 27, 2020). 
55. Violence Against Women and Department of Justice 
Reauthorization Act of 2005, H.R. 3402, 109th Cong. (2005). 
56. Janice Shaw Crouse, The Violence Against Women Act Should 
Outrage Decent People, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP. (Mar. 19, 
2012), https://www.usnews.com/debate-club/should-the-violence-
against-women-act-be-reauthorized/the-violence-against-women-
act-should-outrage-decent-people [https://perma.cc/YCP6-
QNGV]. 
57. Violence Against Women and Department of Justice 
Reauthorization Act of 2005, H.R. 3402, 109th Cong. (2005); 
Crouse, supra note 56. 
58. Kate Bolduan, House Passes GOP Version of Violence Against 
Women Act Renewal, CNN (May 16, 2012), https://www.
cnn.com/2012/05/16/politics/gop-violence-against-
women/index.html [https://perma.cc/ESD5-TQKR]. 
59. Id. 
60. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, S. 47, 113th 
Cong. (2013). 
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Many states began implementing statutes with either 
mandatory or preferential arrest provisions soon after the Act was 
passed in 1994.61 As time has gone by, however, researchers have 
questioned whether these measures have actually helped victims 
of domestic violence.62 While the Act has increased rates of 
prosecution for these crimes, there is little evidence conclusively 
indicating that there has also been a decrease in violence.63 Many 
proponents of the Act argue that the 64% decrease in intimate-
partner violence between 1994 and 2010 was largely attributed to 
the push for stricter mandatory-arrest laws.64 However, this drop 
occurred at the same time at which violent crime rates decreased 
dramatically nationwide.65 Additionally, domestic violence is a 
severely under-reported crime, making statistical analysis 
particularly challenging.66 Therefore, it is difficult to know the full 
effect that the Act had on domestic-violence rates. 
II. State Mandatory-Arrest Laws 
While the Act prompted some states to implement 
mandatory-arrest laws, it did not give those states much guidance 
as to the contents of those laws.67 What resulted was a stark 
disparity nationwide in laws governing officer conduct when 
responding to calls about domestic violence. Three distinct types 
of laws have developed: mandatory arrest, preference for arrest, 
and officer discretion.68 Many laws also have language prompting 
 
61. See Pickert, supra note 45. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13925 (1994); Violence 
Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 
2005, H.R. 3402, 109th Cong. (2005); Violence Against Women 
Reauthorization Act of 2013, S. 47, 113th Cong. (2013). 
68. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.530(a) (2018); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§13– 3601(B) (2018); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-803.6 (2019); CONN. 
GEN. STAT. § 46b-38b(a) (2018); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1031 (a) 
(2019); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2307 (b)(1) (2019); IOWA CODE ANN. 
§ 236.12(2)(b) (2018); LA. STAT. ANN. § 46-2140 A(1) (2015); CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 13701(b) (2019); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209a 
§ 6 (7) (2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-6-311 (2)(A) (2019); N.D. 
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the officer to identify the primary aggressor in cases of mutual 
accusations.69 Others have provisions that specifically identify 
which individuals are able to claim that they are a victim of 
domestic violence70: Some laws limit the definition of “victim” to 
family members of the accused aggressor, while others have 
extended the definition to include dating partners or unmarried 
persons living in the same residence.71 
A. May vs. Shall 
Whether a jurisdiction has a mandatory-arrest, preference for 
arrest, or discretionary-arrest law depends on whether the statute 
contains—or omits entirely—the word “may” or “shall.” Statutes 
that contain “may” 72 allow the responding police officers the most 
discretion.73 This approach assumes that the responding officer 
 
CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-10 (2019); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-619 (a) 
(2016); ALA. CODE § 15-10-3(8) (2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, 
§ 1904(A)(4) (2018); FLA. STAT. § 741.29 (2019); GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 17-4-20(a) (2019); HAW. REV. STAT. § 709-906 (2) (2006); IDAHO 
CODE § 19-603 (6) (2019); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 764.15a (2019); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15a-401(b)(1)(2) (2018). 
69. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 13701(b) (2019); FLA. STAT. § 741.29 
(2019); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 2-204 (A)(1) (2007); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.03(B)(3)(b) (2019). 
70. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 709-906 1(a) (2006); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
5/112A-30 (2009); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.005(2)(a) (West 
2012); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A § 4012 (5) (2017); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS § 764.15a (2019); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-1-7(A) 
(2018). 
71. See Domestic Violence Arrest Policies by State, AM. BAR ASS’N, 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/domestic
_violence/Domestic%20Violence%20Arrest%20Policies%20by%20
State%202011%20(complete).pdf [https://perma.cc/SHK5-EASW] 
(last visited, Oct 3, 2018). 
72. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.03 (a)(4) (2015) (“Any peace 
officer may arrest, without warrant persons who the peace officer 
has probable cause to believe have committed an offense involving 
family violence.”). 
73. See ALA. CODE § 15-10-3(8) (2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, 
§ 1904(A)(4) (2018); FLA. STAT. § 741.29 (2019); GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 17-4-20(a) (2019); HAW. REV. STAT. § 709-906 (2) (2006); IDAHO 
CODE § 19-603(6) (2019); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 764.15a (2019); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15a-401(b)(1)(2) (2018); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-
3-7 (3) (2019); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-404.02(1) (2017); N.M. STAT. 
ANN. § 31-1-7(A) (2018). 
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will have the best ability to determine if an arrest is necessary or 
not.74 To handle the situation properly, the officer will need to 
talk to the parties to see what exactly went on and make their 
own determination.75 Overall, twenty-five states have this type of 
statute.76 
The second type of statute is the pro-arrest statute that has 
been enacted in six states.77 These statutes often do not include 
“may” or “shall” at all.78 Instead, they simply state that arrest is 
the preferred action in the situation.79 These statutes allow 
officers slightly more discretion than they would have in a 
mandatory arrest setting. Jurisdictions that employ this approach 
encourage arrests in domestic violence situations but ultimately 
leave the choice up to the responding officer.80 
The final category is the mandatory-arrest law. These 
statutes contain the word “shall” in the provision, making it 
mandatory for police officers to arrest an individual when 
dispatched for domestic violence.81 This is modified by the 
 
74. April M. Zeoli et al., Mandatory, Preferred, or Discretionary: How 
the Classification of Domestic Violence Warrantless Arrest Laws 
Impacts Their Estimated Effects on Intimate Partner Homicide, 35 
EVALUATION REV. 129, 132 (2011). 
75. Id. at 133. 
76. ALA. CODE § 15-10-3(8) (2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, 
§ 1904(A)(4) (2018); FLA. STAT. § 741.29 (2019); GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 17-4-20(a) (2019); HAW. REV. STAT. § 709-906(2) (2006); IDAHO 
CODE § 19-603(6) (2019); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 764.15a (2019); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15a-401(b)(1)(2) (2018); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-
3-7 (3) (2019); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-404.02(1) (2017); N.M. STAT. 
ANN. § 31-1-7(A) (2018); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 196(6) (2018); 18 
PA. CONS. STAT. § 2711(a) (2019); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. 
art.14.03 (A)(4) (2015); W. VA. CODE § 48-27-1002 (a) (2010). 
77. CAL. PENAL CODE § 13701(b) (2019); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 
209a, § 6(7) (2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-6-311 (2)(A) (2019); 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-10 (2019); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-
619 (a) (2016); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-81-113(a)(1)(A) (2019). 
78. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-6-311(2)(A) (2019) (“Arrest is the preferred 
response in partner or family member assault cases . . . ”). 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
81. ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.530 (A) (2018) ( “An officer shall arrest a 
person when there is probable cause to believe that a crime of 
domestic violence has been committed in past 12 hours.”); see also 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §13– 3601(B) (2018); COLO. REV. STAT. 
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“probable cause” standard. In order to comply with the Fourth 
Amendment under such laws, the Supreme Court held in 
Brinegar v. U.S. that officers may not make a warrantless arrest 
without first having probable cause.82 The Court held that, 
“probable cause to arrest exists when the facts and circumstances 
known to the officer are sufficient to warrant a reasonably 
prudent person in believing that the suspect has committed or is 
committing a crime.”83 The officer must believe that the 
individual being arrested is responsible for committing a crime.84 
Many jurisdictions allow their officers to base assertions of 
probable cause on evidence like injuries to a party, statements 
from witnesses, and even uncorroborated statements by a 
victim.85 These laws have been enacted in twenty-two states.86 
 
§ 18-6-803.6 (2019); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-38b(a) (2018); D.C. 
CODE ANN. § 16-1031 (a) (2019); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2307 (b)(1) 
(2019); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.12(2)(b) (2018); LA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 46-2140 A(1) (2015); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A § 4012 (5) 
(2019); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-3-7 (3) (2017); NEV. REV. STAT. 
§ 171.137 (2019); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2c:25-21 (West 2019); N.Y. 
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.10(1) (2019); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 2935.032(A)(1)(a) (2019); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 133.055(2)(a), (b), 
(c), (d) (2019); 12 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 12-29-3(b), (c) (2014); S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 16-25-70; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-3-2.1 (2015); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-2.2 (2) (2013); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§§10.31.100 (2)(a), (d) (2019). 
82. Brinegar v. U.S., 338 U.S. 160, 171 (1949). 
83. Id. at 175. 
84. Id. 
85. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1031 (a) (2019) (“ . . . probable cause to 
believe physical injury or the treat thereof has occurred.”); W. VA. 
CODE §§ 48-27-1002 (a), (b) (2010). 
86. ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.530 (A) (2018); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §13– 
3601(B) (2018); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-803.6 (2019); CONN. GEN. 
STAT. § 46b-38b(a) (2018); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1031 (a) (2019); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2307 (b)(1) (2019); IOWA CODE ANN. 
§ 236.12(2)(b) (2018); LA. STAT. ANN. § 46-2140 A(1) (2015); ME. 
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A § 4012 (5) (2019); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-
3-7 (3) (2017); NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.137 (2019); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 2c:25-21 (West 2019); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.10(1) (2019); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.032(A)(1)(a) (2019); OR. REV. STAT. 
§§ 133.055(2)(a), (b), (c), (d) (2019); 12 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 12-29-
3(b), (c) (2014); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-25-70 (2015); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 23A-3-2.1 (2015); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-2.2 (2) (2013); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§10.31.100 (2)(a), (d) (2019). 
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No state statute includes any language indicating that the 
officers should take what the victim wants into account when 
deciding whether to make an arrest.87 This is designed to allow 
prosecution in situations in which the victim refuses to press 
charges against their abuser.88 Removing this discretion was 
intended to diminish the burden placed on the victim.89 The 
theory behind this is that the victim may feel psychologically 
trapped by the relationship or attached to their abuser.90 While 
they may call the police in the first place, they may feel hesitant 
or afraid to ask for an arrest once the police arrive.91 
B. Definition of “Family Member” 
According to most mandatory-arrest laws, the relationship 
between the parties determines whether an assault is an act of 
domestic violence and mandates arrest.92 Most domestic violence 
statutes provide that the violence must be perpetrated against a 
“family member,” a definition that changes with each 
jurisdiction.93 However, this limitation can exclude some victims 
of domestic violence because the definition may not include their 
situation. Some of these statutes only cover what the term “family 
member” may traditionally bring to mind - those related to an 
individual through blood or marriage.94 In these jurisdictions, 
individuals who are in dating relationships are not protected, 
 
87. Domestic Violence Arrest Policies by State, supra note 71. 
88. See Pickert, supra note 45. 
89. Eric L. Han, Note, Mandatory Arrest and No-Drop Policies: Victim 
Empowerment in Domestic Violence Cases, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD 
L.J. (2003). 
90. See id. 
91. See generally Iyengar, supra note 14, at 88–89. 
92. Domestic Violence Arrest Policies by State, supra note 71. 
93. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-4-20 (A) (2019); HAW. REV. STAT. § 709-906 
(2) (2006); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/112A-30 (2009); KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 431.005 (2)(a) (West 2012); LA. STAT. ANN. § 46-2140 A(1) 
(2015); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 764.15a (2019); MO. REV. STAT. 
§455.085.1 (2019); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. ART. 14.03 (A)(4) 
(2015); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §10.31.100 (1) (2019). 
94. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-4-20 (A) (2019); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. 
ART. 14.03 (A)(4) (2015). 
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whether they live together or not.95 Some jurisdictions have 
attempted to address this deficiency by including those who are 
not married but are jointly residing in the same residence.96 
Others go as far as to include any individual who formerly resided 
in the same residence.97 In these jurisdictions, an individual could 
be arrested for domestic violence against any current or former 
roommate. 
While a great deal of domestic violence involves co-habitating 
or married couples, violence also occurs between couples who do 
not live together. Statutes that do not include individuals in 
dating relationships not living together miss an entire subgroup 
of victims who may suffer from domestic violence. Some 
jurisdictions consequentially include individuals who have a child 
together or are persons in dating relationships but are not living 
together.98 This is the best approach when defining a “family 
member” because it includes a wide range of individuals who are 
victims of domestic violence. 
C. Definition of “Primary Aggressor” 
Officers may have difficulty deciding the best course of action 
when a call for domestic violence involves mutual accusations of 
abuse by the parties. Some may feel compelled to arrest both 
individuals—known as a “dual arrest”—if they each display signs 
of injury.99 In dual-arrest jurisdictions, both the abuser and the 
victim are arrested, taken to prison, and charged with domestic 
violence.100 Dual arrest can lead to the arrest of victims who did 
 
95. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-4-20 (A) (2019); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. 
ART. 14.03 (A)(4) (2015). 
96. HAW. REV. STAT. § 709-906 (2) (2006); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
5/112A-30 (2009); LA. STAT. ANN. § 46-2140 A(1) (2015); ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A § 4012 (5) (2019); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. 
PROC. § 2-204 (A)(1) (2007); MO. REV. STAT. §455.085.1 (2019); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-6-311 (2)(A) (2019); NEV. REV. STAT. 
§ 171.137 (2019); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.10 (1) (2019); 18 
PA. CONS. STAT. § 2711(a) (2019); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23a3-2.1 
(2019); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §10.31.100 (1) (2019). 
97. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 764.15a (2019); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23a3-
2.1 (2019). 
98. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.005 (2)(a) (West 2012); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS § 764.15a (2019); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23a3-2.1 (2019). 
99. Hirschel, supra note 44. 
100. See id. 
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not initiate the violence but did fight back against their abuser.101 
This can be damaging to victims who may begin to feel that they 
can no longer trust law enforcement to help them when they need 
it most.102 Therefore, victims might not seek help when abused in 
the future.103 
Some statutes explicitly provide for dual arrest.104 Here, 
discretion is taken away from the officer, and both parties must 
be arrested.105 The burden is then placed on a judge to determine 
which party is the victim in each case.106 While this might be 
beneficial in some instances, it is not good for the system as a 
whole. Victims who injure their abuser in self-defense are 
routinely arrested, even though the system was designed to help 
them.107 Because of this effect, providing for mandatory-dual 
arrest is not the best option. 
States with mandatory-arrest laws have seen a substantial 
increase in the number of women arrested in connection with 
domestic violence.108 In some areas, women account for nearly 
twenty percent of those arrested for domestic violence, a 
percentage that is actually higher than the estimated number of 
female abusers.109 Studies indicate that over half of these arrestees 
are victims of domestic violence themselves.110 Some researchers 
 
101. Nat’l Dist. Attorneys Ass’n, National Domestic Violence 
Prosecution Best Practices Guide, WHITE PAPER 1, 19 (2017). 
102. Id. at 13. 
103. See id. 
104. CAL. PENAL CODE § 13701(B) (2019) (“Dual arrests are 
discouraged, but not prohibited.”). 
105. David Hirschel et al., Explaining the Prevalence, Context, and 
Consequences of Dual Arrest in Intimate Partner Cases, U.S. 
DEPT. OF JUSTICE 1, 4 (2007), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/nij/grants/218355.pdf [https://perma.cc/XWF8-NKY4]. 
106. Hirschel, supra note 44. 
107. Elizabeth M. Schneider, Equal Rights to Trial for Women: Sex-
Bias in the Law of Self-Defense, 15 HARV. CIV. RIGHTS. – CIV. 
LIBERTIES. L. REV. 623 (1980). 
108. David Hirschel et al., Domestic Violence and Mandatory Arrest 
Laws: To What Extent Do They Influence Police Arrest Decisions, 
98 J. OF CRIM. L. AND CRIMINOLOGY 255, 259 (2007) [hereinafter 
Influencing Police Arrest Decisions]. 
109. Iyengar, supra note 14, at 88. 
110. Id. 
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argue that this may be a result of dual arrests.111 Dual arrest rates 
also depend heavily on the gender of those involved.112 If the 
offender is female, it is three times more likely that police will 
also arrest the victim.113 Dual arrest is also more likely if officers 
are dealing with a homosexual couple.114 These statistics may 
indicate that there is still implicit-police bias and sex-role 
stereotyping when making arrests under these statutes. 
In order to avoid dual arrest, many jurisdictions require 
officers to identify the “primary aggressor” in the situation.115 The 
most common definition of this term is the individual who 
initiates the domestic violence in that instance.116 Many 
jurisdictions have a list of factors they consider when working to 
establish the primary aggressor.117 These can include the 
 
111. Influencing Police Arrest Decisions, supra note 108, at 259. 
112. Hirschel, supra note 44. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.530 (B) (2018) (“When there are mutual 
accusations, policy of determination of the primary aggressor.”); 
See also ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-81-113 (a)(2)(A) (2019); CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 13701(B) (2019); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-803.6 (2019); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.29 4(b) (2019); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 17-4-20.1 
(A), (B) (2019); LA. STAT. ANN. § 46-2140 B(1) (2015); MD. CODE 
ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 2-204 (B) (2007); MO. REV. STAT. §455.085.3 
(2019); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-6-311 (2)(B) (2019); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 2935.03 (A)(1)(a)(ii) (2014); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-29-
3 (c) (2014); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-25-70 (2015); TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 36-3-619 (b) (2016); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-2.2 (3) (2013); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §10.31.100 (2)(c) (2019). 
116. The Advocates for Human Rights, Determining the Predominant 
Aggressor, STOP VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, http://www.stopvaw
.org/determining_the_predominant_aggressor [https://perma.cc/
JB4E-42PQ] (last updated Dec. 26, 2018). 
117. ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.530 (B) (2018) (“In determining whether a 
person is a principal physical aggressor, the officer shall consider 
(1) prior complaints of domestic violence; (2) the relative likelihood 
of future injury from domestic violence to each person; (2) the 
relative severity of the injuries inflicted on each person; and (4) 
whether one of the persons acted in defense of self or others.”); see 
also ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-81-113 (a)(2)(A) (2019); CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 13701(B) (2019); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-803.6 (2019); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.29 4(b) (2019); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-4-20.1 
(A), (B) (2019); LA. STAT. ANN. § 46-2140 B(1) (2015); MD. CODE 
ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 2-204 (B) (2007); MO. REV. STAT. §455.085.3 
Health Matrix·Volume 30·2020 
Mandatory-Arrest Laws and Domestic Violence 
454 
seriousness of injuries, the strength of both parties, criminal 
history of both parties, and the demeanor of parties.118 
Researchers have found that dual arrest rates are lower in states 
where these primary-aggressor provisions have been 
implemented.119 
Critics argue that these provisions may also be biased against 
male victims of domestic violence whose abusers are female.120 
Factors like strength, skill and the demeanor of the parties can 
work against male victims who may be perceived to be more 
threatening because they are male.121 Others argue that offenders 
may be able to manipulate a system that relies heavily on officers 
making a decision with little information at hand.122 However, 
research indicates that primary-aggressor provisions do cut down 
on dual arrest and can be beneficial in the long run.123 
III. Mandatory-arrest-law effectiveness 
Researchers have conducted several studies to test the 
effectiveness of mandatory-arrest laws. However well-intended 
these laws were, these studies indicate that mandatory arrest may 
not be the appropriate public policy to apply to domestic violence. 
 
(2019); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-6-311 (2)(B) (2019); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 2935.03 (A)(1)(a)(ii) (2014); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-29-
3 (c) (2014); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-25-70 (2015); TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 36-3-619 (b) (2016); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-2.2 (3) (2013); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §10.31.100 (2)(c) (2019). 
118. ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.530 (B) (2018); CAL. PENAL CODE 
§ 13701(B) (2019); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-4-20.1 (A), (B) (2019). 
119. Hirschel, supra note 44. 
120. Deborah Vernon, Honors Thesis, Has Society Created Social 
Injustice for Male Victims of Domestic Violence?, UTAH ST. UNIV., 
at 12 (2017); Emily M. Douglas & Denise A. Hines, The Helpseeking 
Experiences of Men Who Sustain Intimate Partner Violence: An 
Overlooked Population and Implications for Practice, 26(6) J. FAM. 
VIOLENCE 473, 475 (Aug. 2011). 
121. See generally Douglas & Hines, supra note 120. 
122. Hirschel, supra note 44, at 260. 
123. Sarah Smith, In Connecticut, Calling for Help Carries Risks for 
Victims of Domestic Violence, PROPUBLICA (Feb. 16, 2017), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/in-connecticut-calling-for-
help-carries-risks-victims-of-domestic-violence [https://perma.cc/
FGC6-34V3]. 
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There are indications that, rather than protecting victims, these 
laws increase victims’ mortality rates and incidents of intimate-
partner homicide.124 The subsequent sections analyze why these 
laws are generating more harm than good. 
A. Sherman’s Second Study 
After Sherman’s first study was published, several other 
researchers attempted to replicate his results.125 However, none 
were able to do so.126 Furthermore, Sherman’s study was criticized 
for having too short of a follow-up period and thus it ignored the 
cyclical nature of domestic violence.127 While it was based on 
deterrence theory, the study did not gather data on whether the 
offenders actually feared reoffending because of the arrest.128 
Studies in more recent years have evaluated the effects of 
mandatory arrest in two instances: those in which the victim 
reports the crime to the police and those in which the victim does 
not. 
In 2015, just over forty years after his first study, Sherman 
published another study updating his findings.129 Overall, he 
analyzed two different types of sources to come to his conclusions. 
 
124. See Sherman & Harris, supra note 14, at 17. 
125. Fagan, supra note 15; Anthony M. Pate & Edwin E. Hamilton, 
Formal and Informal Deterrents to Domestic Violence: The Date 
County Spouse Assault Experiment, 57 AM. SOC. REV. 691, 691 
(1992). 
126. See Sherman & Harris, supra note 14, at 1. 
127. Domestic violence often follows a repeating cycle. This can involve 
several phases including a tension-building phase, an abusive 
incident, and a honeymoon phase. In the tension-building phase, 
victim may feel as if they are walking on eggshells. This phase can 
last for a few hours—or for months—depending on the relationship. 
The abusive incident occurs when the tension finally breaks. 
Usually, the abuser physically lashes out at the victim. Finally, in 
the honeymoon phase, the abuser may apologize or be extra 
affectionate to make up for the abuse. Once this phase is over, the 
tension-building phase begins again. See generally Jennifer Focht, 
The Cycle of Domestic Violence, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH RES., 
http://www.center4research.org/cycle-domestic-violence/ 
[https://perma.cc/L6LG-YG4V] (last visited Sept. 23, 2019); 
Jeffrey Fagan, Cessation of Family Violence: Deterrence and 
Dissuasion, 11 CRIME & JUST. 377, 387 (1989). 
128. See generally Sherman & Harris, supra note 14. 
129. Id. at 1–2. 
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First, he summarized subsequent research that was unable to 
replicate his original findings.130 Instead, those studies found that, 
in some instances, mandatory arrest was either ineffective or 
doubled recidivism.131 Second, he gathered data in cases where 
victims had reported their abuse to the police.132 His own research 
suggested that more victims died in situations where police made 
an arrest than where police only warned the offending partners.133 
To gather data for his study, Sherman went back to the same 
area that he first studied in Milwaukee.134 
The main effect he discovered was that victims died 
prematurely 64% more often in cases where the suspect had been 
arrested than when the suspect was just warned.135 Heart disease 
was twice as likely for those who had a partner arrested than it 
was for those whose partner was warned.136 However, Sherman is 
unable to provide any explanation for these findings. As of 2019, 
no other study has replicated Sherman’s 2015 findings,137 and thus 
his research is inconclusive. While Sherman’s second study’s 
findings may not be very clear, other studies have found more 
concrete evidence that mandatory-arrest laws are not effectively 
helping victims.138 
B. Other Studies Evaluating the Effectiveness of Mandatory 
Arrest 
Using arrest as a “one size fits all” intervention does not 
benefit all victims of domestic abuse in the same way.139 Overall, 
 
130. Id. at 2. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. at 2. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. at 3. 
135. Id. at 6. 
136. Id. 
137. See, e.g, Yoo-Mi Chin & Scott Cunningham, Revisiting the Effect 
of Warrantless Domestic Violence Arrest Laws on Intimate 
Partner Homicides, 179 J. PUB. ECON. 1, 9 (2019). 
138. Iyengar, supra note 14, at 97. 
139. Mary M. Cavanaugh & Richard J. Gelles, The Utility of Male 
Domestic Violence Offender Typologies: New Directions for 
Research, Policy, and Practice, 20 J. OF INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 
155, 164 (2005). 
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other studies generally conclude that utilizing arrest has no 
significant influence on reducing long-term abuser recidivism.140 
For most abusers, any deterrent effect only lasted for a period of 
up to six months.141 These studies also concluded that arrest has 
different effects for different types of offenders.142 For batterers 
who are employed, have limited arrest records, and are in more 
“stable” environments, arrest had a greater deterrent effect.143 
Batterers who are unemployed, have more extensive criminal 
records, and are of lower socio-economic status experience little 
to no deterrent effect because of the arrest.144 In some cases even, 
the arrest would lead the batterer to kill their partner soon 
after.145 
To better understand offender reactions to different police 
intervention methods, researchers developed four predominant 
batterer typologies based on psychological traits.146 The first 
 
140. Richard A. Berk et al., Bayesian Analysis of the Colorado Springs 
Spouse Abuse Experiment, 83 J. OF CRIM. L. AND CRIMINOLOGY 170, 
198, 200 (1992); J. David Hirschel & Ira W. Hutchinson, Female 
Spouse Abuse and the Police Response: The Charlotte, North 
Carolina Experiment, 83 J. OF CRIM. L. AND CRIMINOLOGY 73, 85, 
106 (1992); Lawrence W. Sherman et al., The Variable Effects of 
Arrest on Criminal Careers: The Milwaukee Domestic Violence 
Experiment, 83 J. OF CRIM. L. AND CRIMINOLOGY 137, 159–60 
(1992). 
141. Christopher D. Maxwell et al., The Preventive Effects of Arrest on 
Intimate Partner Violence: Research, Policy and Theory, 2 
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 51, 53 (2002); Hirschel & Hutchinson, 
supra note 140, at 106. 
142. Pate et al., supra note 125, at 695; Douglas A. Smith et al., Crime, 
Punishment, and Stake in Conformity: Legal and Informal Control 
of Domestic Violence, 57 AM. SOC. REV. 680, 686 (1992); 
LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN, POLICING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: 
EXPERIMENTS AND DILEMMAS 157 (1992). 
143. Pate et al., supra note 125, at 695; Smith et al., supra note 142, at 
686. 
144. Sherman, supra note 142, at 163. 
145. Pate et al., supra note 125, at 695. 
146. Cavanaugh & Gelles, supra note 139, at 161; Amy Holtzworth-
Munroe & Gregory L. Stuart, Typologies of Male Batterers: Three 
Subtypes and the Differences Among Them, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 
476, 481 (1994); Matthew T. Huss & Anthony Ralston, Do Batterer 
Subtypes Actually Matter? Treatment Completion, Treatment 
Response and Recidivism Across a Batterer Typology, 35 CRIM. 
JUST. & BEHAV. 710, 711–12 (2008); Jeffrey M. Lohn et al., 
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category consisted of family-only batterers.147 These individuals 
are characterized by their lower severity of abuse, a lower 
frequency of abuse, lack of personality disorders, lower violence 
generally, and low to moderate rates of drug use and depression.148 
The second group is called borderline/dysphoric batterers.149 
These individuals have moderate to high rates of intimate-partner 
violence, moderate rates of general violence, moderate drug use, 
and do exhibit some personality disorders.150 The third subtype is 
called the generally violent/antisocial batterers.151 These 
individuals have moderate to high levels of intimate-partner 
violence, high rates of generalized violence, and exhibit antisocial 
disorders.152 The final group is called the low-level antisocial 
batters.153 These abusers have moderate levels of family and 
general violence, substance abuse issues, and moderate levels of 
psychopathology.154 
More recent studies have researched the relationship between 
arrests and the reoffending of individuals in these different 
 
Consistency and Accuracy of Batterer Typology Identification, 20 
J. FAM. VIOLENCE 253 (2005); Amy Holtzworth-Munroe et al., 
Testing the Holtzworth-Munroe and Stuart Typology, J. CLINICAL 
& CONSULTING PSYCHOL. 1000, 1000 (2000). 
147. Holtzworth-Munroe & Stuart, supra note 146, at 481; Richard R. 
Johnson & Wendi Goodlin-Fahncke, Exploring the Effect of Arrest 
Across a Domestic Batterer Typology, 66 JUVENILE AND FAM. 
COURT J. 15, 17 (2015). 
148. Holtzworth-Munroe & Stuart, supra note 146, at 481–82; Johnson 
& Goodlin-Fahncke, supra note 147, at 17. 
149. Holtzworth-Munroe & Stuart, supra note 146, at 482; Johnson & 
Goodlin-Fahncke, supra note 147, at 17. 
150. Holtzworth-Munroe & Stuart, supra note 146, at 482; Johnson & 
Goodlin-Fahncke, supra note 147, at 17. 
151. Holtzworth-Munroe & Stuart, supra note 146, at 482; Johnson & 
Goodlin-Fahncke, supra note 147, at 17. 
152. Holtzworth-Munroe & Stuart, supra note 146, at 482; Johnson & 
Goodlin-Fahncke, supra note 147, at 17. 
153. Holtzworth-Munroe et al., supra note 146, at 1007; Johnson & 
Goodlin-Fahncke, supra note 147, at 18. 
154. Huss & Ralston, supra note 146, at 712; Johnson & Goodlin-
Fahncke, supra note 147, at 18; Jill Thijssen & Corine de Ruiter, 
Identifying Subtypes of Spousal Assaulters Using the B-SAFER, 26 
J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1307, 1309 (2011). 
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subtypes.155 Overall, arrest displays no significant effect on any of 
the batterer subtypes.156 Arrest also increased the likelihood of 
future violence among the generally violent/antisocial and low-
level antisocial batterer subtypes.157 In those groups, 35.2% of 
batterers originally arrested were re-arrested for a new domestic 
violence charge within six months compared to the 7.9% who 
reoffended after being warned.158 This suggests that when these 
types of batterers are arrested, they are more likely to react with 
retributive violence towards their partner.159 Furthermore, the 
study argued that officers should consider batterer subtypes when 
deciding how to respond to domestic violence.160 For example, 
those in the family-only subtype are just as deterred by warnings 
as they are by arrest, with a lessened risk of retribution towards 
the victim.161 Therefore, arrest may not be necessary for these 
individuals. For those in the generally violent/antisocial and low-
level antisocial subtypes arrest cannot work on its own.162 
Researchers have found that follow-up actions, such as better 
prosecution tactics, supervision of both the abuser and victim, 
abuser treatment, and victim empowerment, make it less likely 
that batterers will reoffend.163 Mandatory arrest alone does not 
provide for these increased measures, with most batterers leaving 
police custody only after a few days and with little supervision 
after release.164 To account for this, some researchers argue that 
increased pretrial interventions for those individuals actually 
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arrested should be utilized in order to study their effects on 
different batterer subtypes.165 
More recent studies also indicate that mandatory-arrest laws 
make it less likely that a victim will report their abuse.166 
Domestic violence victimizations are only reported by fifty-six 
percent of victims annually in the U.S.167 In states with 
mandatory-arrest laws, this percentage can be even lower.168 On 
average, about 582,000 domestic violence victimizations go 
unreported each year.169 Victims who don’t report domestic 
violence indicate that their decision to do so was informed by 
factors such as personal privacy, a desire to protect the abuser, 
their notion that the crime was minor, being financially 
dependent on the abuser, and fear of retaliation.170 Accordingly, 
victims rarely cite just one reason for not reporting; “it’s often a 
grim mosaic of psychological damage, fear, love and 
dependency.”171 
C. Mental Harm 
Research also recognizes that prolonged exposure to domestic 
violence can lead to mental disorders such as posttraumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD), depression, and anxiety.172 An estimated sixty-
four percent of those suffering from domestic violence will develop 
a type of PTSD in their lifetime.173 It is also rare for victims to 
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develop only PTSD.174 Researchers estimate that forty-eight 
percent of domestic violence victims also report suffering from 
depression in conjunction with other psychological disorders.175 
Symptoms of these disorders can be exacerbated by factors such 
as the severity of the violence, length of exposure to that violence, 
and by how the victim perceives that violence or their lack of 
control over the situation.176 
Mandatory-arrest statutes can exacerbate the severity of 
psychological disorders such as PTSD. Because these laws can 
reduce victim-reporting rates, they make it more likely that 
victim will stay in the abusive relationship for an extended period 
of time.177 This extends the time that they will have to suffer 
violence. Extended exposure to violence can be a factor that 
worsens the severity of victim’s symptoms over time.178 Because 
domestic violence is cyclical, there is also a chance that the 
severity of the violence itself will increase the longer the 
relationship lasts.179 If a victim is fearful of reporting, then staying 
in a relationship may feel like the only option for them. Their 
mental well-being may be worse off in the long run because any 
symptoms of psychological disorders will be worsened by any 
increasing violence.180 
D. Physical Harm 
Mandatory-arrest laws also increase the physical harm that 
victims suffer due to domestic violence.181 While calling the police 
may end the immediate violence, there is a chance that the 
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violence may increase in the future due to the abuser being 
arrested.182 In a Huffington Post Article, Nour Naas recounted the 
story of her mother’s exposure to domestic violence.183 She wrote 
that the first time that her mother called the police on her father, 
“he had violently shaken her and had thrown a chair at her.”184 
After her father returned from being arrested, he threatened to 
kill her mother if she ever called them again.185 The next time the 
police were called to the house, Nour’s mother was already dead 
in an alley, her father having shot her seven times in the chest.186 
Situations like this are all too common. Studies indicate that 
the number of victim deaths due to domestic violence is higher in 
states with mandatory-arrest laws than states that either have 
preferred arrest or discretionary-based laws.187 Some have argued 
that these laws are successful because deaths due to domestic 
violence have decreased nationally over the past twenty years.188 
However, researchers found that states with mandatory-arrest 
laws have a domestic violence homicide rate that is sixty percent 
higher than states with more discretionary laws.189 This is likely 
a direct result of having mandatory-arrest laws on the books. 
Because victims are less likely to report their abuse, they will be 
stuck in the cycle of domestic violence for a prolonged period of 
time.190 The cycle of domestic violence could then lead to their 
partner killing them after the violence reaches a certain point.191 
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Traumatic brain injuries can also develop as a side effect of 
physical abuse. For example, in April 1999, a woman named 
Carolyn received a call from her sister Paula’s husband.192 This 
call came after several months of not hearing from her sister.193 
Paula’s husband told Carolyn that her sister was hurt and in the 
hospital.194 What he didn’t tell her was that Paula was in a coma 
because he had beaten her so badly that doctors had to perform 
emergency surgery to relieve pressure from her brain.195 Now 
Carolyn has legal guardianship over her sister because of the 
lasting effects from her abuse.196 In addition to developing a 
seizure disorder, Paula now has vertigo, memory loss, and 
cognitive issues that make it impossible for her to live on her 
own.197 
Traumatic brain injuries can be common in domestic violence 
victims who are subjected to extended abuse.198 One study looked 
at the prevalence of mild traumatic brain injuries in victims of 
domestic violence.199 Out of the fifty-three individuals in the 
sample, forty-nine (ninety-two percent) indicated their abusers 
had a history of hitting them in the head or face.200 Most 
participants reported “frequent and acute cognitive difficulties, 
including current problems with being easily distracted; 
forgetting appointments; having headaches; and having trouble 
concentrating, paying attention, remembering things, and doing 
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more than one thing at a time.”201 The researchers indicated that 
these are all symptoms of a mild traumatic brain injury, which 
can worsen the longer an individual is exposed to the violence.202 
Because many victims are reluctant to call the police in 
mandatory arrest jurisdictions, this exposure can be longer than 
necessary. 
IV. Recommendations 
A. Preferential Arrest 
Instead of mandatory arrest, statutes should follow a 
preferential-arrest model. One of the main problems with 
mandatory arrest is that it addresses domestic violence strictly as 
a crime without recognizing its place as a deeper social problem. 
However, providing for a complete police deference model may 
cause the system to revert back to the problems that caused 
jurisdictions to enact mandatory-arrest laws in the first place. 
Preferential arrest statutes provide a middle ground between 
these two extremes. Under a preferential-arrest model, officers are 
encouraged to arrest an offender in specific circumstances, such 
as whether the victim was injured, whether a weapon was used, 
or if the offender violated a restraining order.203 Even though 
officers may be encouraged to arrest, they can still decide not to 
arrest based on the situation at hand.204 This type of statute is 
preferable for many reasons. The first is that it allows police to 
retain discretion.205 Research has recognized that there are many 
 
201. Id. at 41–42. 
202. Id. at 43. 
203. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-6-311 (2)(A) (2017); N.D. CENT. CODE 
§ 14-07.1-10 (2007). 
204. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-6-311 (2)(A) (2017); N.D. CENT. CODE 
§ 14-07.1-10 (2007); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-81-113 (a)(1)(A) (2007); 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 13701(B) (2019); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209a 
§ 6 (7) (2010). 
205. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-6-311 (2)(A) (2017); N.D. CENT. CODE 
§ 14-07.1-10 (2007); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-81-113 (a)(1)(A) (2007); 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 13701(B) (2019); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209a 
§ 6 (7) (2010). 
Health Matrix·Volume 30·2020 
Mandatory-Arrest Laws and Domestic Violence 
465 
ways to respond to domestic violence based on victim needs.206 
Victims also respond differently to different policing methods.207 
Under the preferential-arrest mode,, police retain the ability to 
evaluate different situations based on relevant factors.208 These 
statutes also give more weight to the stories of the victim and the 
suspect.209 That way, the victim can feel that their story is being 
heard and the suspect can feel that they are being treated fairly 
by the system.210 
Montana’s domestic violence arrest statute reflects this 
approach.211 The Montana Code provides that, “[a]rrest is the 
preferred response in partner or family member assault cases 
involving injury to the victim, use or threatened use of a weapon, 
violation of a restraining order or other imminent danger to the 
victim.”212 The first good component is that the statute indicates 
that arrest is the “preferred response,” not the mandatory 
response.213 The statute also includes several instances that 
illustrate when arrest is the desired outcome.214 Finally, it 
indicates that the jurisdiction has a policy of identifying the 
primary aggressor in the particular situation.215 Rather than 
providing a definition for what a “primary aggressor” is, the 
statute includes several factors that officers should consider, for 
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example the prior history of violence between the individuals (if 
available), injuries, witness statements, and the apparent fear or 
lack of fear between the parties.216 This is beneficial to the officers 
because it allows them to consider a wide range of factors. These 
factors also make it easier for officers to use their discretion to 
determine when arrest would be the appropriate response. 
Proponents of mandatory arrest may argue that preferential 
arrest will only exacerbate the problems that caused mandatory 
arrest statutes to be enacted in the first place. They posit that, 
with increased discretion, police may not take domestic violence 
calls seriously and victims will not get the assistance they need.217 
However, research has indicated this attitude is no longer 
prevalent in police departments as it was previously.218 Due to 
exposure of nationwide problems with domestic violence, 
jurisdictions have increased development of domestic violence 
training programs.219 A majority of jurisdictions have written 
policies and procedures instructing officers how to react during 
domestic violence calls that promote consistency and best 
practices.220 
While police training has improved since mandatory-arrest 
laws were largely enacted, it must improve further to ensure that 
preferential arrest laws work as well as possible. Currently, 
studies have shown that a majority of police academies only offer 
an average of thirteen hours of domestic violence training.221 
Many other matters, such as operations, firearms, self-defense, 
and the use of force, have far more hours of training dedicated to 
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them.222 In studies, some officers have even reported confusion 
surrounding the complexities of domestic violence and “doubt in 
identifying the primary aggressor and probable cause.”223 
Continued training could therefore help officers who respond to 
these incidents better determine how to act.224 
Expanding police training is not without its own challenges. 
Specifically, one of the main problems is inadequate state and 
federal funding. However, jurisdictions switching over from a 
mandatory to preferential arrest structure may be able to divert 
funds normally used for processing suspects to instituting better 
domestic violence training programs.225 As police departments will 
likely have lower arrest rates, they will also likely have lower costs 
associated with arrest for domestic violence.226 
B. Increased Outreach 
In order to provide a more effective response to domestic 
violence, police should also provide increased outreach and 
services to victims. While many services geared towards helping 
victims exist, many victims do not know how to access those 
services or may be too scared to seek help.227 Furthermore, some 
may criticize the preferential-arrest model because there is a 
chance that officers may abuse their discretion or encounter a 
victim that does not want to go through with an arrest or 
prosecution of their case. Many argue that victims may not know 
what is best for them and that declining to press charges may 
exacerbate violence in the future.228 A way to combat these 
problems is to increase police outreach to those victims that refuse 
to press charges or whose abuser is not arrested by the police. 
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There are many programs that police departments can implement 
in order to achieve this goal. 
One such program is implementing dedicated follow-up 
protocols for victims of domestic violence. Studies have found 
that seventy-six percent of agencies report doing follow up 
interviews with victims of domestic violence after an encounter 
with the police.229 Most of the time, the individuals following up 
are victims’ advocates, detectives, or the original responding 
officer.230 However, there is little information on how these follow 
ups are conducted. The best method would likely be an in-person 
interview rather than a phone call. With an in-person follow up, 
an officer would better be able to determine how the victim is 
faring and whether abuse is ongoing. 
In 2006, officers in High Point, North Carolina were 
dispatched to a domestic disturbance between Darin Jackson and 
his ex-girlfriend Annjanette Lloyd over a set of hair clippers.231 
Six hours later, police received a call from Lloyd’s neighbor who 
had been woken up by Lloyd’s eight-year-old son.232 When the 
police arrived, he told them that Jackson had broken into the 
house and stabbed his mom.233 Police discovered Lloyd lifeless 
inside the house with sixty-three stab wounds and head trauma.234 
When Jackson was arrested, he seemed to show no remorse.235 
Officers would later become frustrated after learning from a 
background check that Jackson had been arrested five days earlier 
for punching Lloyd over a television.236 Jackson had only spent 
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one night in jail and was released.237 Not only that, but social 
services had filed several domestic violence reports on the couple 
throughout their relationship.238 
It was in response to situations like these that the High Point 
police department developed a method called “cocooning.”239 
Under this method, victims are encouraged to surround 
themselves with people who are aware of the domestic violence 
and know the abuser’s identity.240 Police then ask for the contact 
information of individuals within the victim’s security network so 
that they can contact them in case they are unable to reach the 
victim directly.241 Victims are also encouraged to appoint a 
“proximity informant” or an individual who is aware of their 
schedule from day to day and is in contact with them.242 This 
individual should be able to see when something is out of the 
ordinary and contact the police if anything is wrong. 
This system in High Point has proven effective at saving 
lives.243 In one instance, a neighbor saw that the victim’s car was 
still in the driveway at a time where it was unusual for it to be 
there.244 The neighbor was also able to see the victim’s ex-
husband’s car parked down the street.245 Because the neighbor 
was the victim’s proximity informant, they were able to call the 
police, who arrived to find the victim’s ex-husband threatening 
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to kill her.246 In that case, the police were able to get the suspect 
to surrender instead of finding another casualty of domestic 
violence.247 While this may not be the proper solution in all cases, 
increased community and police department awareness of where 
actual threats of domestic violence are can help save lives and 
keep victims safe. 
Other police departments have taken a different approach by 
designating specific units with a goal of fighting domestic violence 
within their community.248 Specifically, the Citrus Heights police 
department in California developed a program called the 
Domestic Violence Response Team (“DVRT”).249 This program 
involved detectives and patrol officers from the police department 
along with victims’ advocates from a local victims’ advocacy 
group.250 These individuals all train together with the police 
department to respond to domestic violence calls.251 The 
department developed a three-tiered response for officers and 
advocates to follow when responding to domestic violence.252 In 
the first tier, advocates will ride with officers to incidents.253 In 
the second tier, advocates will stay on call and respond to an 
incident if prompted by an officer.254 In the third tier, incidents 
are not as severe and do not require an immediate response.255 
Here, advocates will go to the victim’s residence and follow up 
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with them the next day.256 For each call, the dispatch officer will 
determine what tier the call is and inform victim’s groups 
accordingly. In each tier, victims’ advocates will supply the 
victims with information about their services and other 
information to help the victim deal with domestic violence and 
hopefully leave the relationship in the future.257 
This program has been very successful.258 In Citrus Heights, 
before the program was enacted, eight percent of victims were 
using victims’ services.259 Presently, department studies have 
shown that seventy-two percent of contacted victims follow up 
and receive services from the local victims’ advocacy group.260 
Other police departments across the country have also begun 
utilizing the DVRT model to help victims within their 
jurisdictions.261 
This system is beneficial for many reasons. First, it recognizes 
that not every instance of domestic violence is the same. By 
implementing a tiered system, officers and advocates can tailor 
their response to the situation that they are called to. Second, it 
brings together the efforts of police departments and victims’ 
advocacy groups. By combining the efforts of both organizations, 
victims can get support from two different places instead of one. 
They get both the legal support of the police department and the 
emotional and medical support of the victims’ advocacy groups. 
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Finally, this approach gives victims better access to and 
understanding of the services available to them. In more 
traditional jurisdictions, it is the police officers who are supplying 
victims with information about the places that can provide them 
support.262 Then it is left entirely up to the victim to reach out 
and secure the services themselves.263 By having a victims’ 
advocate come with the police officer, the victim is more likely to 
respond to the information and gain a better understanding about 
how they can use those services than they would from an officer 
alone. 
Conclusion 
As more research is done on domestic violence as a whole, 
jurisdictions across the country have begun to take it seriously as 
a crime rather than as a private family problem. While these 
developments are important, law enforcement’s reliance on 
mandatory-arrest laws as a solution is misguided and more 
harmful to victims overall. Domestic violence is not a crime that 
can benefit from a “one size fits all” solution. As research has 
indicated, the psychology behind each domestic abuser can differ 
along with their responses to different types of police intervention. 
When arrest is used in isolation, the laws that were meant to help 
victims instead put them in increasing danger. 
This does not mean that arrest should never be used in 
domestic violence situations. Instead, arrest cannot work as a 
deterrent to domestic abusers alone in most situations. If arrest 
is to be used, police departments need to develop further 
procedures in order to protect victims from any further 
retributive abuse. The solutions utilized in Citrus Heights and 
High Point are good examples of police departments 
implementing new and inventive solutions to the dangerous 
effects that arrest can have on a domestic violence situation. In 
these jurisdictions, the police are involved in getting victims help 
and attempt to stay ahead of any further violence. 
While these procedures are a step in the right direction, 
further research is still needed. There is a dearth of information 
 
262. Metropolitan Police Department, The Police Can Help in Domestic 
Violation Situations, DC.GOV, https://mpdc.dc.gov/page/police-
can-help-domestic-violence-situations [https://perma.cc/EQ2K-
WKRF] (last visited March 4, 2020). 
263. Id. 
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on how different policing methods fare in different areas. 
Individuals in low socio-economic areas may not respond to a 
method that works in a middle-class area. Furthermore, studies 
should be conducted to see how these methods fare with 
individuals of different races, genders, and sexual orientations. 
More information on the subject would help jurisdictions still 
implementing mandatory-arrest laws to view domestic violence as 
not just a crime, but also as a complex social issue. 
